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PREFACE

This work claims the consideration of the historian of the culture of Asia, of the Sanscrit philologist and of the general philosopher.

           It is the last of a series of three works destined to elucidate what is perhaps the most powerful movement of ideas in the history of Asia, a movement which, originating in the VI century BC. in the valley of Hindustan, gradually extended its sway over almost the whole of the continent of Asia, as well as over the islands of Japan and of the Indian archipelago. These works are thus concerned about the history of the ruling ideas of Asia, Central and Eastern.

          It also claims the consideration of the Sanscritist, because it is exclusively founded on original works belonging to the sãstraclass; these are Indian scholarly compositions, written in that specific scien­tific Sanscrit style, where the argument is formulated in a quite spe­cial terminology and put in the form of laconic rules; its explanation and development are contained in numerous commentaries and sub­commentaries. To elucidate this quite definite and very precise termi­nology is the aim of a series of analytical translations collected in the second volume.

          In addressing itself to the philosopher this work claims his consi­deration of a system of logic which is not familiar to him. It is a lo­gic, but it is not Aristotelian. It is epistemological, but not Kantian.

           There is a widely spread prejudice that positive philosophy is to be found only in Europe, It is also a prejudice that Aristotle’s treatment of logic was final; that having had in this field no predecessor, he also has had no need of a continuator. This last prejudice seems to be on the wane. There is as yet no agreed opinion on what the future logic will be, but there is a general dissatisfaction with what it at present is. We are on the eve of a reform. The consideration at this juncture of the independent and altogether different way in which the problems of logic, formal as well as epistemological, have been tackled by Dignãga and Dharmakirti will possibly be found of some importance.

           The philosopher in thus considering and comparing two different logics will perceive that there are such problems which the human mind naturally encounters on his way as soon as he begins to deal with truth and error. Such are, e. g., the problems of the essence of a judgment, of inference and of syllogism; the problems of the categories and of relations; of the synthetical and analytical judg­ments; of infinity, infinite divisibility, of the antinomies and of the dialectical structure of the understanding. From under the cover of an exotic terminology he will discern features which he is accustomed to see differently treated, differently arranged, assigned different places in the system and put into quite different contexts. The philosopher! if he becomes conversant with the style of Sanscrit compositions, will be tempted not only to interpret Indian ideas in European terms, but also to try the converse operation and to interpret European ideas in Indian terms.

          My main object has been to point out these analogies, but not to produce any estimate of the comparative value of both logics. On this point I would prefer first to hear the opinion of the professional phi­losopher who in this special department of knowledge has infinitely more experience than I may claim to possess. I would be amply satis­fied if I only succeed to arouse his attention and through him to introduce Indian positive philosophers into the community of their European brotherhood.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Preface

Introduction

• 1. Buddhist Logic what
• 2. The place of Logic in the history of Buddhism
• 3. First period of Buddhist philosophy
• 4. Second period of Buddhist philosophy
• 5. Third period of Buddhist philosophy.
• 6. The place of Buddhist Logic in the history of Indian philo­sophy
• The Materialists
• Jainism
• The Sankhya System
• The Yoga System
• The Vedanta
• The Mimamsa
• The Nyãya-Vaiseạika System
• 7. Buddhist Logic before Dignaga
• 8. The life of Dignaga
• 9. The life of Dharmakirti
• 10. The works of Dharmakirti
• 11. The order of the chapters in Pramnna-vartika
• 12. The philological school of commentators
• 13. The Cashmere or philosophic school of commentators
• 14. The third or religious school of commentators
• 15. Post-Buddhist Logic and the struggle between Realism and

Nominalism in India

• 16. Buddhist Logic in China and Japan
• 17. Buddhist Logic in Tibet and Mongolia

Part I.—Reality and Knowledge (prãmãnya-vãda)

1. Scope and aim of Buddhist Logic

• 2. A source of knowledge what
• 3. Cognition and Recognition
• 4. The test of truth
• 5. Realistic and Buddhistic view of experience
• 6. Two realities
• 7. The double character of a source of knowledge
• 8. The limits of cognition. Dogmatism and Criticism

Part II.—The Sensible World

Chapter I. — The theory of Instantaneous Being (ksanika-vada).

• 1. The problem stated
• 2. Reality is kinetic
• 3. Argument from ideality of Time and Space
• 4. Duration and extention are not real
• 5. Argument from direct perception
• 6. Recognition does not prove duration.
• 7. Argument from an analysis of the notion of existence
• 8. Argument from an analysis of the notion of non-existence
• 9. Sãntiraksita’s formula
• 10. Change and annihilation
• 11. Motion is discontinuous
• 12. Annihilation certain a priori
• 13. Momentariness deduced from the law of Contradiction
• 14. Is the point-instant a reality? The Differential Calculus
• 15. History of the doctrine of Momentariness
• 16. Some European Parallels

Chapter II. — Causation (pratitya-samutpada).

• 1. Causation as functional dependence
• 2 The formulas of causation
• 3. Causation and Reality identical
• 4. Two kinds of Causality
• 5. Plurality of causes
• 6. Infinity of causes
• 7. Causality and Free Will
• 8. The four meanings of Dependent Origination
• 9. Some European Parallels

Chapter III.— Sense-perception (pratyaksam).

• 1. The definition of sense-perception
• 2. The experiment of Dharmakĩrti
• 3. Perception and illusion
• 4. The varieties of intuition
• Mental sensation (manasa-praktyaksa
• The intelligible intuition of the Saint (yogi-pratyaksa)
• Introspection (svasamvedana)
• 5. History of the Indian vies on sense-perception
• 6. Some European Parallels

Chapter IV.— Ultimate reality (paramartha-sat).

• 1. What is ultimately real
• 2. The Particular is the ultimate reality
• 8. Reality Ỉ8 unutterable
• 4. Reality produces a vivid image
• 5. Ultimate Reality is dynamic
• 6. The Monad and the Atom
• 7. Reality is Affirmation
• 8. Objections
• 9. The evolution of the views on Reality
• 10. Some European Parallels

Part III—The constructed world

Chapter I. — Judgment.

• 1. Transition from pure sensation to conception
• 2. The first steps of the Understanding
• 3. A judgment what.
• 4. Judgment and the synthesis in concepts
• 5. Judgment and name giving
• 6. Categories
• 7. Judgment viewed as analysis
• 8. Judgment as objectively valid
• 9. History of the theory of judgment
• 10. Some European Parallels

Chapter II. — Inference.

• 1. Judgment and Inference
• 2. The three terms
• 8. The various definitions of inference
• 4. Inferring and Inference
• 6. How far Inference is true knowledge
• 6. The three Aspects of the Reason
• 7. Dhamakirti’s tract on relations
• 8. Two lines of dependence
• 9. Analytic and Synthetic judgments
• 10. The final table of Categories
• 11. Are the items of the table mutually exclusive
• 12. Is the Buddhist table of relations exhaustive
• 13. Universal and Necessary
• 14. The limits of the use of pore Understanding
• 15. Historical sketch of the views of Inference
• 16. Some European Parallels

Chapter III. — Syllogism (pararthanumanam).

• 1. Definition
• 2. The members of syllogism
• 3. Syllogism and Induction
• 4. The figures of Syllogism
• 5. The value of Syllogism
• 6. Historical sketch of Syllogism viewed as inference for others
• 7. European and Buddhist Syllogism
• Definition by Aristotle and by the Buddhists
• Aristotle’s Syllogism from Example
• Inference and Induction
• The Buddhist syllogism contains two propositions
• Contraposition
• Figures
• The Causal and Hypothetical Syllogism
• Summary

Chapter IV. — Logical Fallacies.

• 1. Classification
• 2. Fallacy against Reality (asiddha-hetv-abhãsa)
• 3. Fallacy of a Contrary Reason
• 4. Fallacy of an Uncertain Reason
• 5. The Antinomical Fallacy
• 6. Dharmakirti’s additions
• 7. History
• Manuals of Dialectics
• The refutative syllogism of the Mãdhyamikas
• The Vaisesika system influenced by the Buddhists
• The Nyãya system influenced by Dignãga
• 8. European Parallels

Part IV.—Negation

Chapter I. — The negative judgment.

• 1. The essence of Negation
• 2. Negation is an Inference
• 3. The figures of the Negative Syllogism.

The figure of Simple Negation

• 4. The ten remaining figures
• 5. Importance of Negation
• 6. Contradiction and Causality only in the Empirical Sphere
• 7. Negation of supersensuous objects
• 8. Indian developments
• 9. European Parallels:
• Sigwart’s theory
• Denied copula and Negative Predicate
• Judgment and Re-judgment

Chapter II. — The Law of Contradiction.

• 1. The origin of Contradiction
• 2. Logical Contradiction
• 3. Dynamical opposition
• 4. Law of Otherness
• 5. Different formulations of the Laws of

Contradiction and Otherness

• 6. Other Indian schools on Contradiction
• 7. Some European Parallels
• The Law of Excluded Middle
• The Law of Double Negation
• The Law of Identity
• Two European Logics
• Heracleitus
• Causation and Identity in the fragments of Heracleitus
• The Eleatic Law of Contradiction
• Plato
• Kant and Sigwart
• The Aristotelian formula of Contradiction and

Dharmakirti’s theory of Relations      

Chapter III. — Universals.

• 1. The static Universality of Things replaced by similarity of action
• 2. History of the problem of Universals.
• 3. Some European Parallels

Chapter IV. — Dialectic.

• 1. Dignliga’s Theory of Names
• 2. Jinendrabuddbi on the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names
• All names are negative
• The origin of Universals
• Controversy with the Realist
• The experience of individuals becomes the agreed experienceof the Human Mind
• Conclusion
• 3.Sãntiraksita and Kamalasĩla on the negative meaning of words
• 4. Historical sketch of the development of the Buddhist Dialecti­cal Method
• 5. European Parallels.
• a) Kant and Hegel
• b) J. S. Mill and A. Bain
• c) Sigwart
• d) Affirmation what
• e) Ulrici and Lotze

Part V.—Reality of the External World

• 1. What is Real
• 2. What is External
• 3. The three worlds
• 4. Critical Realism
• 5. Ultimate Monism
• 6. Idealism
• 7. Dignãga’s tract on the Unreality of the External World
• 8. Dharmakirti’s tract on the Repudiation of Solipsism
• 9. History of the problem of the Reality of the External World
• 10. Some European Parallels
• 11. Indo-European Symposion on the Reality of the External World

Conclusion

Indices

Appendix

Addenda

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